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The  foreign  policy  of the  United  States,  very  simply  stated,  is
concerned  with  the  security  of this country.  The  conduct  of foreign
relations  is concerned  with  pursuing  the many  domestic  and foreign
interests  of the United  States through  facing  and  settling  sometimes
very  broad  but  often  very  narrow  or  even  exceedingly  technical
issues.  Always  the  basic  concern,  as  the framers  of our Constitution
put  it,  is  "to  secure  the  blessings  of liberty  to  ourselves  and  our
posterity,"  in  all  that  statement  implies,  in  the  way  of  personal,
political,  and  economic  freedom,  in the  way  of  access  to  resources
and to techniques  for using  them, and in the  way of furthering simple
human  dignity.
We  have  seen  in the  postwar  years  that the  pursuit  of the U.S.
interest,  the practice  of foreign policy,  is  given to  increasingly  com-
plex  relationships  of the  United  States  with  the rest of the world.  It
is  now  readily  apparent  that  the  aim  of  U.S.  foreign  policy-the
security of these United States-cannot for long be adequately  served
in  any  but  a  peaceful  world environment.  We  can  shelter  ourselves
for  a  time  from  some  of the  direct  effects  of unrest  in  the  world,
but  ultimately  we  cannot  isolate  ourselves  from  the  serious  and
enduring  consequences  of  unrest.  We  are,  therefore,  vitally  self-
interested  in  solutions  to  unrest,  uncertainty,  and  instability  in  any
part of the world.
The  world  food  outlook  has extreme  significance  in  this  foreign
policy  setting  for  the  immediate  future  and  for the  long haul.  In  its
report, July  1967,  the  President's Food and Fiber Commission stated
that  since  1958  the  thirty-eight  poorer  nations,  with  an  income  of
under  $100  per  year  per  capita,  have  suffered  an  average  of  two
major  outbreaks of violence per country.  That  is a  great  deal of con-
flict,  and  what  is  worse,  these  have  been  predominantly  prolonged
conflicts.  There  is  an  irrefutable  relationship,  the  Commission  con-
cluded,  between  violence  and  economic  backwardness.  If  present
trends  continue,  UN  income projections  tell us that the situation  will
get  worse.  At the present  time,  more  than  two-thirds  of  the  world's
people  live  in  less  developed  countries  and  enjoy  less  than  a  third
of world  income.  By  1985,  three-fourths  of the  world's  people  will
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world's income.
The world food problem  must be considered  as much a symptom
as it is a cause of this fundamental economic and social backwardness.
The  world  food  problem,  therefore,  is  in  its  causes  and  solutions
irrevocably  woven  into  the  fabric  of  less  developed  societies  and
irrevocably  wedded  to the over-all pattern  of development,  of policy
formation,  of  decisions  that  will  be  required  to  make  these  into
advanced  societies.  We  can isolate  the problem  for purposes  of dis-
cussion  and  analysis,  but  to solve  it,  we  must put  it back  and  treat
it  in  context.  We  must  attack  the  whole  problem,  and  the  choices
open  to us  are only choices  of emphasis, degree of effort,  and timing.
There  are important limits on  each  choice.
In  late  August,  the  Department  of  Agriculture  released  a  new
study of the "World  Food Situation"  which made the principal point
that  developed  food  exporting  countries  will  have  the  capacity  to
meet the food import needs of deficit countries  through at least  1980.
The essential problem, the study concludes, will be one of distribution.
This appears  at  first glance  to contradict  what we have long  thought
about the  nature of the problem and the nature of its solution.  Again,
food  scarcity  and  economic  backwardness  are  faces  of  the  same
basic  problem.  This  is evident  whether we  look at  the food problem
in  terms  of the  ability  of deficit  countries  to  produce  food to  meet
their  own  needs,  or  in  terms  of their  ability  to  buy  the  food  they
need  from  others.  The  barriers  to  effective  distribution  are  the
limits  on  available  resources-human,  physical,  technical,  and
capital-in  less  developed  countries.  Generation  and  transfer  of
additional  resources  are  still the solution.
Several  crucial  domestic  and  foreign policy  issues  must be faced
and  resolved  in developed  and  developing  countries  alike  now  and
in  coming  decades.  These  issues  concern  the  scale,  the  means,  the
duration,  the nature,  and the  timing  of the  resource  transfers  to be
made  in  the  attack  on  hunger.  These  issues,  plus  the  great  wealth
and  influence  of the  United  States,  set  the  outlines  of U.S.  policy
and  the character of the U.S.  role.
We  must start  with  what has  become  the  whole pattern  of U.S.
involvement  in  world  affairs  in  the  present  century,  because  the
world food problem, in  its  very nature, cuts  across  the whole pattern.
We  have  inherited  leadership  in the  search  for an  enduring equilib-
rium  in world  politics.  We  have  had  to  undertake  increasingly  the
role  of leader  and  stabilizer  of the world's  monetary  and  payments
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scientific  advance,  at  the same  time  the  principal  borrower  of good
ideas  from  abroad.  We  have  come  to  lead  in  the  spread  of many
highly  technical  bodies  of  knowledge  intrinsic  to  the  conduct  and
to  the  advancement  of the  modern  world  economy.  We  have  come
to  need  the  goods,  the  services,  the  materials  in  some  degree  from
all  quarters  of  the  globe.  In  all  this  we  have  become  deeply  and
irrevocably  "involved  in  mankind."  We  have  come,  of  necessity,
to  leadership  in  the  fight  against  economic  backwardness  including
the  war  on hunger.
Secretary  Rusk,  in  his  September  8  press  conference,  put  the
situation  squarely:
Here  we  are,  with  an  economy  which  is  approaching  a  gross
national  product  of 800  billion  dollars  a year,  trading with  the rest of
the  world  by  the  tens  of  billions.  Now,  if we,  with  this extraordinary
wealth,  act  as  though  we  are  a voracious  economy  drawing  upon  the
rest  of the  world  for  their goods  and  raw  materials  and  filling  their
markets  with  our goods,  indifferent  to  what  happens  to  their  econo-
mies and their future, then we  are going to be  isolated by the choice  of
the  rest of the  world, and  properly  so.  We  and other developed  coun-
tries  have  got  to  take  a  concern  in  the  capacity  of  the  so-called
developing  countries  to  get  on  with  their job  more  rapidly  than  they
could without assistance  from the outside.
The policy  we  are now pursuing  based  on  this involvement  and
the  realities  of our  own  situation  as  well  as  those  of others,  consists
of at least seven  key  elements:
1. The United  States  cannot  go  it alone.  This  is  not a judgment
based  merely  on  economic  capacity.  It  is  important  to national  will
-morale-that  all  others  share  with  us  in finding  solutions  to  the
common  problem  of  all.  There  is  an  element  of  Rudyard  Kipling
too:  of keeping  our  heads  when  all  about  us  are  losing  theirs  and
blaming  it on us.
2.  We  must over  time  increase  the volume  of food  aid to poorer
countries  as  a vital  interim  measure.  The United States  has  shipped
an  average  of $1.5  billion  worth  of food  aid  yearly  since  P.L.  480
became  law  in  1954.  This has been the largest  element  in  the 23-25
million  ton  yearly  food  grain  imports  of the  developing  countries
in  recent  years.  The  Department  of  Agriculture's  world  food  sit-
uation  study suggests  that the food-grain  import  needs of developing
countries may rise to 50-60 million tons in 1980, if historic production
trends  continue.  It  is  improbable  that  the  developing  countries
will be able to buy the bulk of these imports with their own  resources,
if projected  income  trends  continue.
503.  We  must  keep  up  our  reserve  capacity  to  meet  short-term
emergency  food  situations  without  severely  upsetting  the  develop-
ment  programs  of the  countries  affected.  In  1966  the United  States
shipped  over  8.5  million  tons  of grain  to  India,  much  of it  needed
to  offset  monsoon  failure.  This  plus  drought  conditions  in  North
Africa  made heavy  calls  on our  supplies.
4.  We  must  concentrate  on  assisted  agricultural  self-help  in the
poor  food  deficit  countries.  This requires  a  careful program of food
aid  to  meet  vital  needs  without  undermining  productive  energies,
of other  assistance-cash,  techniques,  agricultural  inputs,  agribusi-
ness  products  and  investment-and  of  policy  development  and
resource  allocation  in  recipient  countries.  This  approach,  placing
primary  emphasis  on  food  production  in  the  developing  countries
themselves,  is based  on  much  more  than  a  conscious  political judg-
ment  that  developed  countries  cannot  go  on  indefinitely  meeting
deficits  with  food  aid.  It  is  critical  to the  attack  on  economic  back-
wardness.
5.  We  must  avoid,  in  the  attack  on  hunger,  any  weakening  of
over-all  development  effort.  This  requires  that  we  guard  against
repeating  in  reverse,  the  earlier  mistake  of  neglecting  agriculture
while we  concentrated  on industry.  It  requires  a major effort to keep
up  the volume  of assistance  to nonagricultural  areas while increasing
assistance to  agriculture.
6.  We  must  enlist  the  increasing  support  of  all  developed
countries.  This  is  a  matter  of  maximizing  resource  flows,  but  it  is
also  a recognition  of the political  facts  of  life in free  societies.  Eco-
nomic  capacities  and  the  ethics  of burden  sharing  given,  we  can  do
much  more  collectively  and  sustain  it  longer  than  we  can  hope  to
achieve individually.
7.  We  must  enlist the increasing  participation  of the  developing
countries  themselves  in  finding  the  policy,  technical,  and  resource
solutions  to the problem.  It  is their problem,  to be  solved  mainly by
their  own  actions  and  individual  decisions  and  collective  will.  We
cannot  substitute  for  this,  and  we  should  not expect  or be expected
to provide  the  final solutions  from outside.
Translating  these  basic  policy  imperatives  into  actions  and
action  programs  is  a  complicated,  often  slow  and  tedious  business.
It is, in  every  aspect,  a challenging  one.
The  Food  for Peace  Act  of  1966  has  two  features  of great  im-
portance  to the policies outlined  above.  First, this  new law  modified
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surplus  disposal  was  discarded  in  favor  of planned  production  for
aid  uses.  This  is  a change  of primary importance.  Some steps  affect-
ing  this year's  production  have  already  been taken.  Second,  the  new
law provided  a clear legal  base for encouraging  agricultural  develop-
ment.  In  fact,  it made  self-help  performance  a factor  in future  eligi-
bility for food  aid.
It  has  been  stated  and  reiterated  frequently  over  the  past  year
that  our  surpluses  are  gone.  The  sliding  trend  of  the  U.S.  wheat
carry-over,  from  upward  of  1.5  billion  bushels  down  to  little  more
than  400  million  bushels  during  the  1960's  is  a  forceful  reminder
that the  supply is not  inexhaustible.  This year's wheat crop of around
1.5 billion bushels is roughly in keeping with our carry-over,  domestic
use,  cash  export,  and  food  aid  needs,  and  the  management  of this
supply  (its  orderly  movement  to  intended  destinations)  is  of  no
lesser domestic  and foreign policy importance  now than it always  has
been.
In July  1966, Secretary Rusk proposed to the OECD Development
Assistance Committee meeting in Washington that a world emergency
food  reserve  be  developed.  Several  proposals  to this  end  are  being
studied.
In  the food  aid agreements  we  have  negotiated  this year  (some
fifteen  or  so)  agreed  self-help  measures  have  been  included.  These,
of necessity,  vary widely to fit situations, for example,  from Pakistan,
where visible  and  encouraging  progress  is being  made  in agriculture,
to others in which  a start must be made from lower stages of develop-
ment.
We  have  sought  in  various  international  forums  during  the past
year  to keep the  flow of increased food  aid additional  to other forms
of aid.  An  important  instance  is  the  emergency  food  aid  for  India
effort pursued  in the  framework  of the  IBRD-led  India consortium.
The  list  of  international,  multilateral  institutions  for  burden
sharing is  impressive.  To the older,  successful IBRD, IDA,  and Inter-
American  Development  Bank  have  been  added  the Asian  Develop-
ment  Bank  and  the  food aid  committee  of the International  Grains
Arrangement.  These  are doing  much to  encourage  regional  coopera-
tion,  to  pull  together  resources,  select  important  activities,  and
coordinate  efforts  in development  assistance.
The food  aid  component  of the  new world  grains  agreement  to
take  effect  next July  will  provide  4.5  million tons  of food  to needy
countries.
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an important  forum  for  consideration  by  the  developing  countries,
the  second  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development
in  New Delhi  next February.
What  is  the foreign policy  outlook?  The activities  and  initiatives
just  described  are  all  important,  but  more,  much  more  remains  to
be done.  The basic policy  courses  we are on  are the  correct ones,  but
the  flesh  and  blood  of foreign  relations  and  domestic  relations-
action  to keep these policies  and the resource  transfers  to back  them
advancing-will  call for  constant  approach,  explanation,  and initia-
tive both  at home  and abroad.
The  foreign  assistance  base  for  the  food,  cash,  technical,  and
other  aid  that  the  food  outlook  would  dictate  has  been  stagnating,
has  been  shrinking in terms  of national  wealth,  and  in recent  action
of the Congress  it has been absolutely  falling.  Here at home  we have
a  tremendous  job  of  education  and  justification  to  do  to  maintain
and to increase  the flow of aid resources.
We  have to pause  here  and reflect on  what we  are, because what
we  are is  the prime content  of national  interest,  the working  material
of  foreign  policies,  and  the  stimulus  for  what  we  can  do  in  foreign
assistance.
We are obviously  a nation  of immense  wealth  and influence.  We
too  often underrate  this  wealth  as productive  capacity.  Also,  we  are
uncertain  about  the  great  influence  we  have;  at  the  same  time  we
are  wasteful of it by using  it at  times  on too  small objectives.
We habitually label  as national policy  failures  the manifestations
of some  of our most  spectacular  successes.  Many  of our  troubles  in
Western  Europe  are by-products  of our  success  in  dealing  with  the
postwar politico-economic confrontation with the Soviet Union. There
are parallels in  our relations  with  developing  nations.
We  remain wary  of new involvements.  Yet our whole  system  de-
pends  on  such  involvements  in  one  degree  or  another.  I  doubt  that
we  can find a significant  area  of activity  that would profit  from the
breakdown  of relationships  with  the rest of the world,  in some  cases
with very  specific  areas  of it.
We  are  a  nation  deeply troubled.  Watts,  Detroit,  Free  Speech  at
Berkeley, Vietnam,  the Congo, the Middle East, and many other con-
cerns seem to spread  us  thinly  over a host  of preoccupations.  These
would indeed  "make  us rather bear these  ills we have than seek after
others that  we  know  not of."
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wealthy  as  we  are,  these  interests  are  important,  and  it  is  not easy
for us  to do short-run  harm  to  them in the  interest of long-run  gains.
We are not a passionate nation, but we are not fully  up to viewing
the  rest  of  the  world  dispassionately  or  to  viewing  its  problems
separately.
We know  that, psychologically,  gratitude is an uncommon human
response,  but  we  often  expect  it  anyway.  It is,  therefore,  difficult  to
separate  the  fact  of aid  to  a  country  from  the  fact  of  its  behavior
toward us.
We  have  been  given  to  expectations  of quick results  from effort.
Our national  outlook  is  built  on  a spectacular  rate of advancement.
The recovery  of Europe with  U.S. assistance  fitted these expectations.
The advance  in developing  nations, so  far, has  not.
All  of these  obviously  are interwoven  facets  of national outlook.
They affect  what  we  can  do,  when  we  can  do  it, how  much  we  can
devote to  it,  how long  it can  be  sustained,  and  where  we can  under-
take  it.
With  all  these  qualities,  we  know  that if the  world  food problem
were  on  us  now  as  a  crisis,  we  would  wade  in.  However,  what  we
face  is  not  an  immediate  food  crisis  but  a pressure,  a pressure  that
calls  for  sustained  action  over  a long  period  to avoid  deep  crisis  in
the end.  We  are  in  a  war  in  which,  if we  succeed,  the major  battles
will  never be  fought.  This has  great bearing  on  our will to attack,  to
mount  an  effective  campaign.  I think the measure of what  is needed
to  keep  up the level  of U.S.  leadership  and participation  in  meeting
the  food problem  is  in  large degree preset  by these  factors.
In  this frame,  we have  work to do on all fronts and many  impor-
tant points  to  keep  in mind.
We  have run P.L.  480, the food  aid program,  with  a complex  of
domestic  and  foreign  policy  aims  in  mind.  These  aims  have  grown,
in law and in practice, while at the same time changes of law, harden-
ing  terms  and  conditions,  have  weakened  the  influence  this  tool
provides  and  have  restricted  our  opportunities  for  using  it.  We  cer-
tainly  need  a  new  appreciation  of what food aid  can  and  cannot  do,
both  at home  and  abroad.
The Department of Agriculture's world food situation study signals
an important food aid dilemma for us: How can we keep  concessional
sales, ours  and  others,  from  interfering with  cash  markets?  How  can
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tive cash  demand  in our  own and in world  markets?  We must move
with  care,  because  our  ability  to  sustain  effort  will  be  affected  by
success  or  failure  in  keeping  up  our  shares  of world  cash  markets.
Other  people  have  problems  too.  In  seeking  to  increase  burden
sharing, we have to keep in mind that it is no easier in Western Europe,
Japan,  or  elsewhere  to justify politically  a  rising  and continuing  aid
program.
Ideally  we  should  be  seeking increasingly  multilateral  programs.
This is not easy. We sought in the Kennedy Round grains negotiations
a  multilateral  food  aid  program  under  international  management.
This  was  not possible.  The host of bilateral  interests  reflecting  tradi-
tional  overseas  ties-particularly  of  Western  Eurpoe-and  fear  of
being  engulfed  in  endlessly  mounting commitment pose  strong polit-
ical  barriers.
Again,  ideally,  a high  order of coordination  is  called  for among
international  and  national  aid  programs  and  institutions.  The  uses
of  some  institutions  in the  international  sphere  were  constrained  in
the  compromises  underlying  their  formation.  Cooperation  exists  but
it is  and  will  remain  highly informal  for  some time.  We may  in  the
meantime  have  to  create  new  institutions  for  specific  jobs  rather
than adapt old ones.
Ultimately  we  have  to keep  in mind  problems  of  sovereignty.  It
is difficult  in the  extreme to mount  and pursue  the type of programs
needed  to  get  the results  that  both  fit  country  situations  and justify
our  undertakings.  It  is  difficult  indeed  to  do  this  without  apparent
and  inevitably  disruptive  issues  of interference  arising.  We  will  have
to be  patient  with  this.  Many  new nations,  some  old  ones,  have  not
yet  learned  that  any  relationship  worth  the  trouble  is  a diminution
of sovereignty,  a cost that comes  with  the advantage.
To  repeat,  our  choices  in  attacking  the  food  problem  are  only
choices  of emphasis,  degree of effort,  and timing.
On timing,  the risks  all  counsel  against delay.  It is not fair to say
that we face this  moment  a crisis of starvation.  We face now and must
face  for  some  time  a  crisis  in human  relations,  because  it  is  fair  to
say  that  we  face  continuing  and  increasing  unrest.  The  tether  on
timing is,  therefore,  indefinitely  short.
On degree of effort, we still need to know more about the problem
and we  must still decide  on important  elements  of attack.  What,  for
example,  is  our  main  goal-to  keep  per  capita  food  supplies  from
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ment  in diet,  to upgrade  minimum  diets through nutritional  improve-
ments  such  as  lycine  fortification;  or to  achieve  at  some  reasonable
future  date  a  dietary  parity?  The  range  is  wide  and  the  challenge
mounts  rapidly  as  we  move  across  it.  We  do  not  know yet precisely
where the goal lies, but the specter of unrest, the prospect of continued
blunting of human  capacity  by malnutrition  and undernutrition,  puts
the needed degree  of effort in the high  range.
Dr.  Mosher  has suggested  a sustained effort of 1 percent of GNP.
This  is  an  indicative  target.  The  emphasis,  as  a  matter  of practical
policy,  does not  lie with  helping  agriculture  to  the significant  neglect
of any other  area of development.
These,  as  I  see  them,  are  the  dimensions  of the  problem  of in-
sufficient food,  of economic  backwardness.  We must learn  to be both
more  confident  and  more humble  in what we  as  a nation  undertake
as our share  in this  attack.  As a nation, we still have some  misgivings
about becoming  further  involved in the rest of the world,  and I think
that  we  worry  more  than  is  needed  about  our  economic  capacity
to  sustain  and  increase  the  assistance  effort.  On  the  other  hand,  as
we  look at  our  own  troubled  society,  it seems  clear that  some of the
best  tools  we  have  are  imperfect-that  they  need  and  can  undergo
refinement  in  other  hands.  In  the  whole  sphere  of techniques,  from
growing  wheat  to planning  families,  we  can  learn  much  from  other
people's uses  of our devices.
The stakes are high in whatever we  do. I do not believe that we as
a  nation  can  afford  any  increase  in  the  world's  present  unrest.  It is
amply  clear  that  these  interests  are  now  greatly  affected  and  can  in
time  be  undermined  by  continuing  unrest.  With  the  many  troubles
we now face, at home and abroad,  a sustained and increased assistance
effort  directed  to  alleviating  the  causes  of this  unrest  no  doubt  will
take  more  than  ordinary  human  powers  of  concentration.  But  we
cannot  for  long  or  in  any  significant  populated  area  of the  world
afford  to  be  diverted.  If  we  permit  ourselves  to  be  diverted,  then,
as  Secretary  Rusk  concluded  in  his  September  8 remarks:  "There
is  a  failure  of character  in  this  country  that  will have  the  most  far-
reaching consequences  for our future."
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